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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of five payment for ecosystem service (PES) schemes at 
meeting conservation objectives when the spatial configuration is important in meeting desired 
landscape patterns.  The five PES schemes are: 1) fee-simple acquisition; 2) subsidies; 3) 
tradable development rights (TDR) with zoning; 4) mitigation banking; and 5) purchased 
development rights (PDR) easements.  Findings are that tradeoffs exist between PES schemes for 
meeting spatial conservation objectives.  The appropriate PES scheme incentive mechanism for a 
given region will depend upon economic demand as well as the landowner and landscape 
characteristics of the conservation region.   
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1. Introduction 
Ecosystem services are those goods and services produced by the natural environment 
and that are critical for sustaining life.  Encompassing services such as flood prevention, natural 
pollination, habitat, and ecotourism, ecosystem services are interdependent and supported by one 
or more ecosystem functions (de Groot et al., 2002; Ruhl, 2008).  The impact of human activity 
on our natural environments has diminished the quality and quantity of ecosystem services.  
Ecosystem services, in which the benefits supplied are difficult to value accurately because the 
benefits provided are not understood well and usually have no close substitutes (Daily et al., 
1997). 
Conserving and managing ecosystems is increasing in importance as anthropogenic 
intrusions leave larger impacts in our natural systems.  Often, the landscape in developing areas 
is fragmented by human uses.  The resulting impact is a reduction of biodiversity and a loss of 
ecosystem services.  As private property boundaries serve to further dissect ecosystems, 
conservation efforts to protect and restore ecosystem services will benefit from landowner 
cooperation and coordination of private conservation efforts across property lines (Yaffe, 1998).    
Further, experiences with environmental land use regulations from implementation of the 
Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act have illuminated the inefficiency associated 
with command and control approaches to protecting ecosystem services on private lands (see 
Brown and Shogren, 1998).  When landowners are forced to incur the social costs of providing a 
public good, creative avoidance strategies are often employed.  As a result, the social costs of 
providing the desired conservation object are often amplified due to a reduced opportunity set for 
protecting ecosystem services.   
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A remedy often proposed by interest groups is to implement a payment for environmental 
services (PES) scheme.  Wunder (2007) defines a PES schemes as ―a voluntary, conditional 
agreement between at least one ―seller‖ and one ―buyer‖ over a well-defined environmental 
service—or a land use presumed to produce that service‖ (also see Engel et al., 2008).  
Implementing a PES scheme allows landowners to voluntarily participate and compensates 
landowners for the costs of conservation on their land, which often mitigates avoidance 
strategies.     
In addition, many species and ecosystem services require spatial configurations to 
enhance the benefits they provide to society.  Recently spatially explicit models have been 
designed to capture the tradeoffs between spatially allocating conservation within the landscape 
and conservation costs (Ando et al, 1998; Dreschler and Watzold, 2001; Hartig and Drechsler, 
2009; Hamaide and Sheerin, 2010).  These research projects focus on the low cost landscape 
configuration in the absence of individual and group landowner decisions.  However, these 
authors do not propose a method for transferring funds from government and non-government 
environmental organizations (NGEO) conservation coffers to landowners (Chomitz et al., 2006).  
Given limited agency budgets, the allocating mechanism is not a trivial matter.  The assumption 
that compensation subsidies equivalent to foregone productive use will induce landowners to 
voluntarily conserve the desired configuration ignores the strategic actions of landowners as they 
optimize over the various land use rents, and minimize the risk associated with coordinating 
conservation decisions within the landscape (see Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003).  Further 
landowners possess private information concerning the productive value of their land and can 
use their private information to exact information rents from the regulator (Ferraro, 2008).  A 
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simple one dimensional PES scheme will typically be insufficient to meet a voluntary spatially 
dependent conservation agenda.     
Meeting multiple objectives requires the use of multiple incentive mechanisms—
potentially one for each objective.  If the regulators objective is to conserve a targeted spatial 
configuration voluntarily on private land, the incentive mechanism will need one component to 
induce voluntary participation and a second component to create the desired spatial 
configuration.  We suggest five PES schemes for conserving spatially dependent ecosystem 
services: 1) Fee simple acquisition; 2) Subsidies; 3) Tradable development rights with zoning; 4) 
Mitigation Banking; and 5) Purchased development rights (conservation) easements (see 
Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003; Yamasaki et al., 2010). 
2. PES Schemes for Conserving Spatially Dependent Ecosystems Services 
Fee Simple Acquisition 
Fee simple acquisition is the purchase of land with all of its inherent property rights. 
Government agencies and nongovernment environmental organizations (NGEOs) will enter into 
a voluntary agreement with landowners to purchase all rights in the land including the ecosystem 
services.  A common PES scheme employed by land trusts, fee simple acquisition is used to 
protect ecological services in regions particularly sensitive to damage generated by 
anthropogenic encroachment such as urban sprawl.   
Rissman and Merenlender (2008) identify fee simple acquisition in the San Francisco 
Bay area to be a PES scheme used more frequently in local government land use planning.  Fee-
simple parcels are smaller in size with larger perimeter to core ratios, tend to be located more in 
urban areas designated as open space, and owned more frequently by government agencies.  The 
tendency towards smaller parcels is not surprising given the significant cost of acquiring land 
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with all land use rights intact (Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003). Fee simple acquisition does allow 
for greatest ability to protect valuable ecosystem services in perpetuity (Davis et al., 2006; 
Messer, 2006).  However, a tradeoff may exist between long-term control of the environmental 
resource and the size of the protected area.     
Implementation Issues  
Voluntary participation dictates market value be the minimum price paid for the desired 
land.  As the land parcel becomes more critical to the desired landscape conservation pattern, 
landowners gain in market power; holdouts might occur in an effort to increase market value 
(Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003).  Information rents may also be present due to landowners’ 
private information concerning both conservation and non-conservation values (Ferraro, 2008).  
Conserving a spatial landscape design using a fee-simple acquisition approach may be cost 
prohibitive in many regions. 
In addition, conservation lands acquired through fee-simple acquisition must also be 
managed to maintain or enhance the supply of ecosystem services.  Shaffer et al. (2002) estimate 
the annual management costs to be about one percent of the acquisition costs and to become an 
increasing proportion of the total costs of conservation when fee-simple acquisition is used to 
meet environmental conservation goals.     
Subsidies 
Subsidies are financial assistance offered to landowners by government agencies or 
NGEOs to either restore ecosystem services or employ best practices for protecting existing 
ecosystem services.  Subsidy payments can be designed to incentivize landowners to maintain 
their land in its natural state or to mitigate the environmental impact of development by helping 
the landowner meet maintenance and restoration costs of ecosystem services.  The most common 
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subsidy currently used in the United States of America is administered by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) through the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  From 
1992 to 2001, 15 billion dollars were awarded as short-term CRP subsidies (Lerner et al., 2007).   
The CRP allocates subsidy dollars based upon an environmental benefits index. CRP 
subsidies are awarded to the contracts that provide the greatest benefit per dollar requested.  The 
CRP does not necessarily target the spatial allocation of conservation to obtain the desired 
landscape pattern (Stoms et al., 2004).  However, some states have designed programs that 
provide additional payments to land enrolled in the CRP to aggregate conservation efforts across 
landowners and to subsidize additional ecosystem improvements and restoration (OWEB, 
2011)
1
, proving subsidies can be designed to coordinate voluntary conservation efforts across the 
landscape and landowners.    
Parkhurst et al (2002) propose the Agglomeration Bonus as a vector of subsidies that can 
conserve land voluntarily in a predetermined desired spatial configuration.  The agglomeration 
bonus is a vector of subsidies that can be positive or negative and that attach to specific 
landscape characteristics.   A flat subsidy induces voluntary participation while a shared border 
subsidy coordinates the conservation within the landscape.  Positive subsidies create an explicit 
network externality between adjacent land parcels and neighboring landowners by paying an 
additional agglomeration bonus when they retire land adjacent to other conserved parcels, both 
their own and their neighbors.  Negative subsidies work to repel the conservation decisions of 
neighboring landowners (Parkhurst, 2007), which is effective when the social benefit of 
ecosystem services are larger when several disjoint parcels ore conserved.  Combining positive 
                                                          
1
 Oregon’s Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) illustrates the idea of an allied land retirement bonus scheme. The CREP pays 
an extra bonus to enrollees along a stream if at least 50 percent of the stream bank within a 5-mile stream segment is enrolled in the US 
Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  Additional increases in the CREP payment are made when instream water 
leases are made available on enrolled lands (OWEB, 2011) 
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and negative subsidies makes the agglomeration bonus flexible to create many different spatially 
conserved landscape configurations.   
The agglomeration bonus has been proposed as a promising PES scheme for conserving 
biodiversity in many environmental settings (see Smith et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2007; Dreschler 
et al., 2007; Chomitz et al., 2006).  However, several challenges to implementing multiple 
dimension subsidies including the agglomeration bonus have been recognized. 
Implementation Issues 
Ferraro (2008) evaluates the differing approaches for allocating contracts for conserving 
biological amenities.  Information rents exist in all scenarios due to landowners’ private 
information.  A common approach for allocating conservation contracts is to have landowners 
submit bids indicating the payment they require to conserve their land.  The regulator can then 
compare the environmental benefits per dollar derived from each contract and choose those 
contracts that provide the largest benefit per dollar.  Adjusting this process to satisfy a multi-
dimension subsidy like the agglomeration bonus when each contract then represents a contiguous 
land mass and several landowners may be complicated.  The market power increases to the 
owners of each bid as the number of bids decreases.  The increasing market power could result in 
an increase in information rents (Ferraro, 2008).  Further, creating opportunities and institutions 
to promote the understanding of the agglomeration bonus by the landowners and to coordinate 
bids could impose additional costs on the landowners and regulatory agencies (Parkhurst et al., 
2002).  Evidence on combinatorial auctions suggest when the items being auctioned are 
complements the combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous auction (see Tanaka, 
2007).  Whether this holds for the multi-dimension subsidies that target the landscape design is 
an open question. 
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Use of multi-dimensional subsidies like the Oregon CREP program and the 
agglomeration bonus pay an additional premium for the coordination of landowner conservation 
efforts into desired landscape conservation configurations.   The additional premium may be 
useful in offsetting the transactions costs incurred with coordinating conservation efforts and the 
risk premium necessary to offset landowners’ reliance on the actions of neighboring landowners.  
Contracts for contiguous multi-landowner parcels could have individual payments contingent 
upon the actions of all the landowners.  The larger the custodial costs, the larger the number of 
coordinating landowners, and the longer the contract horizon, the larger the risk the landowner 
will need to internalize.  Consequently, the coordinating premium or agglomeration bonus will 
need to be sufficient to compensate for the risk.  Conditions may exist where an agglomeration 
bonus like subsidy mechanism is preferred to other payment mechanism such as heterogeneous 
landowner subsidies (Drechsler et al., 2007).
2
   
An additional cost associated with the multi-dimensional subsidies is that the incentive 
structure may create multiple Nash equilibria.  Each equilibrium encompasses a set of 
conservation actions and associated payoffs such that no landowner has an incentive to deviate 
from their given choice of conservation strategies.  The design of multi-dimensional subsidies 
creates the maximize payoffs for landowners at one Nash equilibrium (the dominant Nash 
equilibrium) which represents the desired landscape configuration.  However, in practice 
achieving this dominant Nash equilibrium may be challenging (Parkhurst et al., 2002; Parkhurst 
and Shogren, 2007, 2008).  Further, if the ecosystem services are fluid and nonhomogeneous 
within the landscape, coordinating effort to sustain renewable resources poses additional 
                                                          
2
 Landowners earning a disproportionate share of the subsidy are often incentivized to coordinate group 
conservation efforts to insure their earnings.  The agglomeration bonus can be designed to provide for landowners 
to earn excessive rents which could facilitate members of the group to incur the costs of collaboration.  
Heterogeneous payments serve to compensate landowners for lost productivity.  They do not create network 
externalities that will promote collaborative conservation efforts (Raymond, 2006).  
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problems for the design of a multi-dimension subsidy to be effective within this environment 
(Smith et al., 2009).   
Tradable Development Rights 
Tradable development rights (TDR) programs specify a predetermined maximum level of 
development within a specified region, and then distribute development rights equal to the 
permissible total amount of development to landowners within the region.   Landowners who 
keep their development levels below their allotted development rights level can sell their surplus 
development rights to other landowners, or they can use them to offset development on other 
properties.  To ensure that development rights serve their purpose as an incentive to change 
development control to desired social levels, total development levels within a given region are 
limited such that the development rights are seen as a scarce resource, which is valuable to 
developers and NGEOs (Hanley, Shogren, and White, 1997; Ruhl, 2008).   
TDR schemes push development towards the land with the highest developmental value.  
It does not, however, protect the land with the highest conservation value, nor does a TDR 
scheme protect the land in the desired spatial configuration.   To accomplish this added 
objective, a TDR policy would need to be joined with an additional incentive specifically 
addressing the spatial configuration.  Mills (1980) proposes using zoning land use restrictions in 
conjunction with a TDR policy.  The regulator can then zone land within a specified region that 
is best protected for valuable ecosystem services for conservation (sending area) and provide 
landowners developmental rights that can be traded with landowners in areas zoned for 
development (receiving areas). Initially, the allowed development in a receiving area is less than 
the profit maximizing development level, providing receiving area landowners’ incentives to 
purchase TDRs from sending area landowners (Ruhl, 2008). 
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Many applications of TDRs with zoning have been implemented over the past few 
decades in an effort to protect numerous ecosystem services.  Florida, through the Rural Lands 
Stewardship Act has implemented a TDR with zoning policy to protect both natural resources 
and farmland (Ruhl, 2008).  The Pinelands program in New Jersey employs a TDR with zoning 
policy to protect forest lands, species and other historical sites (Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003).   
Chomitz et al. (2004) apply TDRs with zoning to a spatial simulation of the Atlantic Rainforest 
of Brazil.
3
   
Many regulators find a TDR policy to be attractive because the cost of preserving land is 
borne by the developer and internalized in the selling price of developed land.  The cost of 
protecting the valuable ecosystem service is incurred by those who benefit.  However, several 
challenges exist in implementing a TDR with zoning policy to achieve the desired landscape 
configuration. 
Implementation Issues 
A TDR with zoning policy is not fully voluntary.  Landowners relegated to a sending area 
are not allowed to develop their land.  Compensation for conservation is facilitated through the 
allocation of TDRs.  Landowners may object to being forced to conserve land and as such may 
prematurely develop land to avoid what may be perceived as an unjust taking of their land 
(Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003).  The zoning of conservation and development by state and local 
agencies potentially reduces efficiency through avoidance strategies or by expending resources 
lobbying the regulator to gain a favorable outcome.  As such zoning detracts from the efficiency 
properties of a pure TDR policy.  
                                                          
3
 See Kaplowitz et al., (2008) for an overview of the practical uses and concerns of planning professionals regarding 
the implementation of TDRs.  
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 Drechsler and Watzold (2009) designed a TDR mechanism that incorporates a 
biodiversity measurement algorithm that allows landowners to meet the conservation objective 
with greater cost efficiency by spatially allocating the conserved land parcels.  The number of 
parcels necessary to satisfy the biodiversity requirement depends upon the spatial allocation of 
conservation within the landscape.  Thus, biodiversity network externalities are created and 
traded theoretically conserving the ecosystem service with the low cost spatial conservation 
landscape.  Their research concludes that the TDR algorithm is effective so long as the 
development values of the land maintain some correlation below a critical randomness measure 
(Dreschler and Watzold, 2009).   
Both the TDR with zoning and the TDS with biodiversity algorithm require the 
administrating agency to establish markets to facilitate trades, track and document the available 
development following trades, and monitor and enforce agreements.  Additional, the TDR with 
biodiversity algorithm will require the administrating agency to educate landowners on the 
impact of coordination within the landscape on the amount of biodiversity created, hence the 
development rights available for trade.   In addition, a landowner may have a difficult time  
understanding the effects on biodiversity across neighboring landowners’ conserved parcels, 
creating coordination problems impacted by landowner risk preferences.  The TDR policy as 
proposed by Dreschler and Watzold (2009) is likely to complex to be implemented without 
significant and costly oversight.     
For a TDR policy to be effective the demand for development must be sufficient to 
compensate for the opportunity cost of restricted lands.  Further, the supply of TDRs must be 
sufficient to keep price at an attractive level for developers.  Thus, the equation that determines 
the rate at which a TDR transfers from conservation to development is critical to the success of 
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the policy (Ruhl, 2008; Kaplowitz et al., 2008). Implementation of a TDR policy may not be 
justified in some more rural areas where insufficient demand exists. In this case, one remedy is to 
increase the demand by increasing the size of the geographical area.  However, increasing 
receiving areas to generate more demand creates tradeoffs between cost efficiencies and desired 
landscape patterns (Chomitz et al., 2004).  The monetary costs of conservation may be reduced 
but at an expense of a less desired landscape conservation pattern and less ecosystem benefits.     
Mitigation (Conservation) Banking  
Developers undertaking a new project are often required to mitigate the adverse effects of 
their activities, which can be onsite or the developer can purchase development credits to satisfy 
the regulation off site.   Development credits can be purchased as needed or the developer can 
purchase excess credits and bank them to fulfill mitigation requirements of future projects.  
Developers purchase these credits from private or publicly owned mitigation banks; prices are 
determined by supply and demand of credits.  A developer purchases credits so long as the price 
of the credit is less than return from developing the land.  New mitigation banks will enter the 
market if positive economic profits exist; whereas market competition will lower the price of the 
credits (Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003).
4
   
 The number and type of credits a mitigation bank can sell depends upon the quality and 
type of ecosystem service supplied.  The regulatory agency allows for restoration and 
improvement of ecosystem services by awarding mitigation bank owners additional credits for 
the increased ecosystem benefits.  In California, mitigation banks are commonly used to offset 
the impacts of development on endangered species and associated habitat and to mitigate impacts 
                                                          
4
 Creating mitigation banks in pursuit of profits has been termed entrepreneurial mitigation 
banking and constitutes over 300 (78% of all) wetland mitigation banks across the USA 
(Robertson and Hayden, 2008). 
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of developmental activities on wetlands (CDFG, 2011).  Entrepreneurial wetland banks, 
mitigation banks operated for profit, are common in the Chicago area to offset the loss of 
wetlands due to development (Robertson and Hayden, 2008).    
Implementation Issues 
Mitigation banking aggregates ecosystem services into larger preservation reserves; 
however, often times more dispersal of the environmental amenity is preferred (see Saunders et 
al., 1991).  Aggregating ecosystem services that provide more benefits when dispersed 
throughout the landscape (or watershed) into one large reserve could decrease the social benefits.  
Entrepreneurial interest into mitigation banking creates even larger reserves to capture scale 
economies (Robertson and Hayden, 2008).
5
  The economic cost of mitigation is reduced but at a 
decrease in the derived ecosystem benefits.  
Mitigation banking also serves to reallocate wetlands from urban areas to more rural 
areas, disadvantaging people in urban areas as critical wetland services are lost (Boyd and 
Wainger, et al., 2002; Ruhl and Salzman, 2006).   Shifting the benefits from a high value area to 
a low value area reduces the cost of mitigation.  Regulating the size of the region in which a bank 
is located and can sell credits serves to keep ecosystem services local where benefits may be 
larger (Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003).    
Further, restored ecosystem services often have temporal requirements before the benefits 
derived from the restored ecosystem service can be ascertained.  However, regulatory agencies 
will often allow the bank owners to sell credits prior to the time where restoration can be fully 
assessed.  Mitigation banks may sell credits for expected benefits that never materialize resulting 
in a loss in ecosystem services.  Also, measurable proxies (such as counting acres) implemented 
by regulatory agencies to determine functional value of the restored ecosystem services have 
                                                          
5
 See Ruhl and Salzman (2006). 
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assessment inefficiencies.  Mitigation banks rarely meet their mitigation objectives; the value of 
the ecosystem services lost to development is not fully replaced (Ruhl and Gregg, 2001).          
Purchased Development Rights (PDR) Easements 
 Ownership of land provides the landowner certain rights regarding how the land can be 
used, which include the right to exclude others from using the land, the right to develop the land, 
the right to produce commodities, and the right to employ other legal rent-seeking activities.  A 
conventional easement is a legal instrument that serves to separate specific rights in the land and 
transfer those rights from the landowner to another entity.  A PDR easement severs the 
developmental rights of the land (any actions that are non-compatible to conservation) which can 
then be sold to a separate party for a specified period of time for a cash payment, usually at the 
fair market value of the easement—the difference between the easement-free value and the 
easement-encumbered value of the property (Parkhurst and Shogren. 2003).   
The concept of an easement is captured by Coase (1960) in his seminal article The 
problems of social cost.  Coase argued social costs could be mitigated through bargaining as 
opposed to more aggressive government intervention.  PDR easements allow a buyer(s) and 
seller(s) to interact in the market to make a voluntary transaction.  Transactions only occur if 
both parties are able to benefit from the arrangement.   
PDR easements are commonly used by NGEO and government agencies as a PES 
scheme for protecting ecosystem services.  In Maryland, a PDR scheme is used to retire the 
developmental rights from agricultural lands while leaving the landowner on the property.  The 
land selection process selects parcels based on the bid easement value ratio but does not have a 
mechanism for coordinating conservation within the landscape (Horowitz et al., 2009).   Liu and 
Lynch (2011) show PDR policies have had a significant impact in slowing the conversion of 
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farm lands into more developed regions.  Stoms et al. (2011) show that acquiring more 
information regarding cost and benefits allows for a more effective targeting of a conservation 
landscape design.     
Implementation Issues 
Reverse auction mechanisms which are commonly employed to choose lands for PDR as 
a PES scheme typically rank order a benefit cost ratio and then choose those contracts with the 
largest ratio.   By choosing contracts simultaneously, the regulator loses the opportunity to 
capture network externalities that result when conserved parcels share common borders.  
Alternatively, allowing for sequential choice of contracts would more readily capture 
coordinated conservation network externalities, but would do so with higher costs.  Landowners 
may realize the increased value of their parcel to the landscape conservation design and act 
strategically.  Further, information rents may be more extensive (Ferraro, 2008).  Reverse 
auctions that recalibrate contract rankings each round tend to protect more ecosystem services 
for a fixed budget (Horowitz et al., 2009).  The larger the opportunity set, the better able the 
regulator is to satisfy optimal landscape designs.   
Discussion and Conclusion         
Two goals that are inherent in government and NGEO conservation efforts are to meet 
the conservation objective and to do so at the minimum possible cost.  Meeting these goals is a 
trivial matter for a government regulator armed with perfect information regarding the minimum 
cost landscape design that meets the conservation objective and who can induce all landowners 
to participate voluntarily for compensation equivalent to the lost value of their land in non-
conservation activities.  However, this situation does not exist. 
 
 
16 
 
In the real world regulators are forced to make tradeoffs between the strengths and 
weaknesses of PES schemes as they relate to the attributes of the targeted landscape.   We 
identify three key attributes for determining which mechanism would be most effective at 
meeting the desired conservation landscape pattern: 1) Developmental Pressure; 2) Landowner 
Attitudes and Values; and 3) landscape needs for ecosystem services. We address each in turn. 
Development Pressure  
When development pressure is strong market forces will increase the costs of 
conservation.  PES schemes that harness the market and internalize the costs of protecting 
valuable ecosystem into the value of the development—development is forced to ―pay its own 
way‖, will provide greater ecosystem services.  TDRs with zoning and Mitigation Banking will 
be better able to protect the desired ecosystem configuration when market demand is thick.  Fee-
simple acquisition, the agglomeration bonus, and PDR easements will be cost prohibitive.  
Government coffers will likely be insufficient to conserve the lands necessary to meet the 
landscape design. 
In a weak development market, implementing a TDR with zoning or Mitigation Banking 
PES scheme may require the regulator to make the market too large allowing the magnitude of 
the local losses in ecosystem services to outweigh the gains as ecosystem services are aggregated 
to a remote location (Boyd and Wainger, et al., 2002; Ruhl and Salzman, 2006).  When 
developmental pressure is weak, the value of non-conservation activities is lower making PDR 
easements, the agglomeration bonus, and fee-simple purchase more attractive.    
Landowner Attitudes and Values   
  Landowners may view their role as a steward of the land and their autonomy in managing 
their land as necessary and sufficient for protecting the vast ecosystem services provided on their 
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land.  Government intervention in land uses, no matter how innocuous, may be viewed as 
untenable.  Even a gentle nudge in the form of a subsidy may violate this sense of autonomy and 
good stewardship.  The least intrusive PES scheme is fee-simple acquisition; a voluntary 
agreement between parties to sell all rights in the land at the market value. The most intrusive 
PES scheme would be TDR with zoning, particularly for those landowners in a sending area.  
When attitudes toward autonomy are strong for landowners within the conservation landscape, 
government should seek less intrusive PES schemes to meet landscape designs, or work in 
partnership with NGEOs to satisfy the provision of ecosystem services within the landscape.   
 Attitudes and values towards conservation may also be present within the targeted 
conservation area.  Targeting landowners with high conservation values may reduce the costs of 
implementing PES schemes to meet the targeted landscape design.  The compensation necessary 
to enroll lands may be less because the market price is offset by the landowner’s conservation 
value.  In addition, landowners whose land use decisions are already in alignment with the 
provision of desired ecosystem services if left to steward the land will have lower costs of 
maintenance.  Here, PDR easements and the agglomeration bonus would be most effective at 
meeting desired landscape patterns.  However, the mechanisms that are often used to capture 
individual values, such as reverse auctions, are subject to rent seeking as landowner’s benefit 
from their private information (Ferraro, 2008).     
Landscape Needs for Ecosystem Services  
 The provision of each ecosystem service requires specific conservation efforts and spatial 
landscape designs.  Within the targeted landscape many ecosystem services are available.  In 
addition the regulator may have competing objectives (Nelson et al., 2008).  Whether several 
small or a single large conservation patch is necessary will depend on the ecosystem services 
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being protected (Parkhurst and Shogren, 2008).  PES schemes such as the agglomeration bonus, 
PDR easements, and fee simple acquisition are relatively flexible and can be used to meet 
diverse goals and objectives.  TDR with zoning and mitigation banking may be less flexible due 
to the necessary government oversight to create markets, record transactions and monitor and 
enforce land use restrictions.  The tendency for entrepreneurial mitigation banking to create 
larger contiguous ecosystem service to capture economies of scale decrease the flexibility for 
mitigation banking to meet landscape designs requiring several small preserves.    
   If developmental demand is high, social values for autonomy are high, and 
requirements for ecosystem services are to aggregate demand into one large contiguous 
conservation reserve, mitigation banking would be the best PES scheme.  Alternatively, where 
development demand is high, social values for autonomy are high, but ecosystem services 
require a landscape pattern that allows for several small conservation reserves, the TDR policy 
with zoning is the better PES scheme.    
For areas where developmental pressure is low, conservation values are high, and the 
desired landscape design requires one large area, the agglomeration bonus will likely be more 
efficient.  Where objectives can be met with several small reserves, tradeoffs exist between the 
agglomeration bonus and the PDR easement PES scheme, depending on whether a combinatorial 
auction or a reverse auction for heterogeneous values is more efficient (Ferraro, 2008; Tanaka, 
2007).   
Designing PES schemes to satisfy desired landscape designs will depend upon the 
underlying natural, social, and economic characteristics of the targeted conservation region. 
There is not a one size fits all approach to designing PES schemes for conserving desired 
landscape patterns.  The good news, with thoughtful reflection regulators can capture significant 
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economic gains by designing the PES scheme to adhere to socioeconomic and bioeconomic 
characteristics of the targeted landscape.    
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